

Automatic Test Case Generation: Toward Its Application in Exploit Generation for Known Vulnerabilities

> **Emanuele lannone** University of Salerno, Italy



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SOFTWARE ENGINEERING SALERNO

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Empirical Software Engineering



Software testing is expensive, taking between 30-40% of total project effort Software testing is expensive, taking between 30-40% of total project effort

Exhaustive testing would be great: checking ALL possible inputs to maximize the found bugs



```
void foo (int a, int b) {
1 if (a < 0)
2 System.out.println("a is negative");
3 if (b < 0)
4 System.out.println("b is negative");
5 return;
}</pre>
```



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void foo (int a, int b) {
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Criterion Statement Coverage

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void foo (int a, int b) {
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3 if (b < 0)
4 System.out.println("b is negative");
5 return;
}
Criterion Goals</pre>
```

 $\{1, 2, 3, 4, 5\}$

Statement

Coverage









Unfortunately, this is tedious if done manually

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Fortunately, we have automated solutions

AUTOMATIC TEST CASE GENERATION

Reformulating the creation of test cases as an **Optimization Problem**

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METAHEURISTICS

Generic procedures to define an optimization algorithm able to quickly explore the search space and provide near-optimal solutions Reformulating the creation of test cases as an **Optimization Problem**

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METAHEURISTICS

Generic procedures to define an optimization algorithm able to quickly explore the search space and provide near-optimal solutions

Tabu Search

GENETIC ALGORITHMS

Ant Colony Optimization Simulated Annealing

Inspired by the natural selection mechanisms, evolves a set of candidate solutions to optimize a given fitness function

GENETIC ALGORITHMS

Inspired by the natural selection mechanisms, evolves a set of candidate solutions to optimize a given fitness function

Initial Population



Inspired by the natural selection mechanisms, evolves a set of candidate solutions to optimize a given fitness function



Initial Population

• Current population





- Current population
- New solutions (offsprings)





- Current population
- New solutions (offsprings)














```
void computeTriangleType() {
1 if (a == b) {
   if (b == c)
2
3
      type = "EQUILATERAL";
    else
4
      type = "ISOSCELES";
    else if (a == c) {
5
      type = "ISOSCELES";
6
    } else {
      if (b == c)
7
8
        type = "ISOSCELES";
      else
        checkRightAngle();
9
      }
     System.out.println(type);
10
}
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Individual Encoding \$t=Triangle(int,int,int):\$t.computeTriangleType() @ 10, 12, 5 @Test public void test(){ Triangle t = new Triangle(10, 12, 5); t.computeTriangleType();

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Individual Encoding

f(x) = AL(P(x),t) + BD(P(x),t)

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Now we can repeat the entire process selecting a different coverage target.

Use Cases of ATCG

Making the System Crash

Supporting Debugging Facilitate the Tester's Job



Test Code Quality

Setting the Metaheuristic



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Toward Automated Exploit Generation for Known Vulnerabilities in Open-Source Libraries

Emanuele Iannone1, Dario Di Nucci2, Antonino Sabetta3, Andrea De Lucia1 1SeSa Lab - University of Salerno, Fisciano, Italy ²Tilburg University, JADS, 's-Hertogenbosch, The Netherlands 3SAP Security Research, France eiannone@unisa.it, d.dinucci@uvt.nl, antonino.sabetta@sap.com, adelucia@unisa.it

Abstract-Modern software applications, including commercial for the infamous HEARTBLEED bug. In that case, a "naive" ones, extensively use Open-Source Software (OSS) components, accounting for 90% of software products on the market. This has serious security implications, mainly because developers rely on non-updated versions of libraries affected by software vulnerabilities. Several tools have been developed to help developers detect these vulnerable libraries and assess and mitigate their impact. The most advanced tools apply sophisticated reachability analyses to achieve high accuracy; however, they need additional data (in particular, concrete execution traces, such as those obtained by running a test suite) that is not always readily available.

In this work, we propose SIEGE, a novel automatic exploit generation approach based on genetic algorithms, which generates test cases that execute the methods in a library known to contain a vulnerability. These test cases represent precious, concrete evidence that the vulnerable code can indeed be reached; they are also useful for security researchers to better understand how the vulnerability could be exploited in practice. This technique has been implemented as an extension of EVOSUITE and applied on set of 11 vulnerabilities exhibited by widely used OSS JAVA libraries. Our initial findings show promising results that deserve to be assessed further in larger-scale empirical studies.

Index Terms-Exploit Generation, Security Testing, Software Vulnerabilities

I. INTRODUCTION

The adoption of software reuse, particularly of third-party libraries released under open-source licenses, has dramatically increased over the past two decades and has become pervasive in today's software, including commercial products. Recent analyses [1] estimate that over 90% of software products on the market include some form of OSS components. Like any other piece of software, third-party libraries may contain flaws [2], [3], whose negative effects are amplified by the fact that they occur in components that are broadly adopted [4], [5]. The complexity in the dependency structures of modern software systems makes things worse: the impact of the defects occurring deep in the dependency graph is difficult to assess [6] and to mitigate [7]. One of the primary forms of defect that regularly affect third-party libraries are vulnerabilities [8], which expose the software to potential attacks against its confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA) [9]. For these reasons, to exploit vulnerabilities are inherently different from those third-party vulnerabilities represent the main threat caused by inadequate dependency management practices [4] since they expose client applications (directly, or transitively through potentially long dependency chains) to abuse, as happened

vulnerability in OPENSSL 1.0.1 exposed almost half-million websites (17% of the total at the time), supposedly protected through SSL, to buffer over-read attacks [10]. As time goes by, more and more vulnerabilities of popular OSS libraries are being discovered [8] and publicly disclosed in vulnerability databases, among which the de-facto standard National Vulnerability Database (NVD) [11], where vulnerabilities are documented according to the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) standard. This growing trend motivated the inclusion of "Using components with known vulnerabilities" into the OWASP Top 10 Web Application Security Risks [12] in 2013. As of today, that risk is still in the OWASP top-ten.

Numerous detection and assessment tools have been developed to tackle this problem [13]-[17]. Almost all of them analyze a project searching for known vulnerable OSS dependencies. Whenever a vulnerable dependency is found, the common mitigation action consists in updating it to another non-vulnerable version. While this solution seems reasonable and easy to adopt, it can be difficult to implement in practice. particularly when the library to be updated is not a direct dependency but a transitive one, or when the affected system is operational in a productive environment and serves businesscritical functions [3], [18]. Other tools have tackled this problem by providing fine-grained code analyses to reduce the number of false alerts (i.e., dependencies flagged as vulnerable but that do not expose the client application to any threat) [16], [19], [20] in an effort to prioritize library updates. In this regard, tools such as ECLIPSE STEADY provide a combination of both static (i.e., call graph-based) and dynamic analyses (i.e., test-based) to maximize the reachability of known vulnerable library constructs (e.g., method, class) starting from the client application code. In particular, the dynamic reachability analysis requires a significant amount of data from the client application test suite (i.e., execution traces) to make an effective vulnerability assessment. Unfortunately, many software projects are not adequately tested [21]. Furthermore, the test cases that an attacker would try to trigger needed for functional testing. Indeed, attackers would try to explore corner cases and unusual execution conditions.

Novelty. In this work, we propose SIEGE (Search-based



Toward Automated Exploit Generation for Known Vulnerabilities in Open-Source Libraries E. Iannone, D. Di Nucci, A. Sabetta, A. De Lucia. In: Proceedings of the 29th IEEE/ACM International Conference on Program Comprehension (ICPC), 2021.

Lucia1

inisa.it

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SIEGE runs on an arbitrary Java application that includes vulnerable dependencies



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SIEGE extracts the entire classpath call graph and the control flow graphs



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SIEGE needs to locate the target vulnerable construct:

- (1) Class name
- (2) Method name
- (3) Line number



SIEGE needs to locate the target vulnerable construct:

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Prepare the fitness function that rewards the test cases that are closer to the target line





evolved with a GA...





...it is considered an exploit!








Does SIEGE succeed in generating exploits of third-party vulnerabilities included within client applications?

KB Dataset

















Does SIEGE succeed in generating exploits of third-party vulnerabilities included within client applications?

Commons Compress Tomcat Jasypt Jenkins Multijob **Commons FileUpload**

- HttpCommons Client
- 🜍 Zeppelin
- 🜍 Nifi
- 🏹 Mailer





- Commons Compress
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Does SIEGE succeed in generating exploits of third-party vulnerabilities included within client applications?

Commons Compress
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- Commons Compress
- Tomcat
- 🌍 Jasypt
 - Jenkins
 - **Nultijob**



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Does SIEGE succeed in generating exploits of third-party vulnerabilities included within client applications?



The **intrinsic complexity** of a vulnerability makes the exploit generation harder





Does SIEGE succeed in generating exploits of third-party vulnerabilities included within client applications?



The **intrinsic complexity** of a vulnerability makes the exploit generation harder



The **way** the client application "guards" the vulnerable constructs makes the exploit generation harder



Does SIEGE succeed in generating exploits of third-party vulnerabilities included within client applications?



The **intrinsic complexity** of a vulnerability makes the exploit generation harder



The **way** the client application "guards" the vulnerable constructs makes the exploit generation harder



The **GA settings** influences the exploit generation performance

Future Directions

USA

N/S/

Risk Reporting SIEGE could produce a report in which it **explains** why it succeeded/failed.

NASA

Future Directions



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Future Directions

Vulnerability Generalized Description Automatically build the fitness function using Steady's Patch Analyzer **Risk Reporting** SIEGE could produce a report in which it **explains** why it succeeded/failed.

Future Directions

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Extended Evaluation

Consider real-world client applications and larger set of CVEs



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